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THE COST OF FREE SPEECH:  RESOLVING THE 
WEDDING VENDOR DIVIDE 
Victoria Cappucci* 
 
As marriage equality becomes fully realized in the United States, business 
proprietors increasingly refuse to service same-sex weddings on religious 
grounds.  However, at the same time, state laws protect same-sex couples 
from discrimination in places open to the public.  Such competing values 
have resulted in a line of “wedding vendor” cases.  As the cases continue to 
proliferate, this Note examines when, and to what extent, the otherwise 
equally important values of free expression and equality should trump one 
another. 
This Note analyzes First Amendment compelled speech claims within the 
line of wedding vendor cases:  specifically, whether wedding goods and 
services are covered by the Free Speech Clause and, if so, what level of 
scrutiny a court should employ to determine the constitutionality of an 
antidiscrimination law.  This Note demonstrates that patchiness within the 
compelled speech doctrine and a lack of clear U.S. Supreme Court guidance 
after Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission have 
resulted in a “split” approach to resolving these issues.  This Note ultimately 
argues that if the vendors’ goods and services rise to the level of sufficiently 
expressive conduct, then a court should apply intermediate scrutiny to an 
antidiscrimination law incidentally burdening that conduct.  In the 
alternative, this Note provides a legislative solution to mitigate the tension 
between religious liberty and equality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[F]ew persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought 
of its creation as an exercise of protected speech. 
—Justice Anthony Kennedy1 
 
 1. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 
(2018). 
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Americans care equally about religious liberty and civic equality.2  Yet, 
they are ambivalent as to when the former should trump the latter.3  That 
indecision is mirrored in the law, further aggravating the social conflict.4  For 
example, courts are hamstrung when tasked with balancing religious liberty 
and marriage equality.  Is it possible to resolve these competing values or are 
they trapped in a zero-sum contest? 
Barronnelle Stutzman, a wedding vendor, provides a timely illustration.  
Ms. Stutzman is an elderly woman who owns a small flower shop in 
Washington State.5  She lived a quiet life until the Washington attorney 
general sued her in 2013 for discriminating against Robert Ingersoll and Curt 
Freed, a same-sex couple.6  Ms. Stutzman declined to provide her floral 
arrangements for Mr. Ingersoll and Mr. Freed’s wedding because of her 
religious beliefs.7  At the same time, Mr. Freed and Mr. Ingersoll had a 
freestanding right to be free from discrimination under state law.8  The 
conflict between the parties continuesMs. Stutzman has appealed the case 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.9 
The litigation concerning Ms. Stutzman, Mr. Freed, and Mr. Ingersoll is 
representative of a larger line of “wedding vendor cases.”10  Such conflicts 
are not going away11 because the religious liberty arguments pose perplexing 
legal questions.  Parties like Ms. Stutzman plead their cases on free speech 
rather than free exercise grounds, arguing their goods and services are 
 
 2. See JOHN CORVINO ET AL., DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 1 
(2017); Where the Public Stands on Religious Liberty vs. Nondiscrimination, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.pewforum.org/2016/09/28/where-the-public-stands-on-
religious-liberty-vs-nondiscrimination/ [https://perma.cc/6DEY-8JVF]. 
 3. See CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2 (“Isn’t everyone in favor of religious liberty, and 
everyone against discrimination?  Well, yes and yes, sort of.”); Douglas Laycock, The 
Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 58 (2018). 
 4. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 58–60. 
 5. Broad Support for Floral Artist’s Freedom as Case Heads Back to US Supreme Court, 
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.adflegal.org/detailspages/press-
release-details/broad-support-for-floral-artist-s-freedom-as-case-heads-back-to-us-supreme-
court [https://perma.cc/2BGD-G66K]; see also Alliance Defending Freedom, Meet Barronelle 
StutzmanADF Case Story, YOUTUBE (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=44jgKXnkJhU [https://perma.cc/5J3H-6AWA]. 
 6. See Alliance Defending Freedom, supra note 5. 
 7. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 8. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1212–13 (Wash. 2019), petition for 
cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (No. 19-333). 
 9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 19-333 
(U.S. Sept. 11, 2019); see Barronelle Stutzman, Opinion, Barronelle Stutzman:  Your 
Religious Liberty Is in Danger if I Lose Mine in a Same-Sex Wedding Court Case, FOX NEWS 
(Sept. 28, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/barronelle-stutzman-religious-liberty-
supreme-court [https://perma.cc/L6RN-62VK]. 
 10. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (wedding cakes); Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019) 
(wedding videography); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 405 F. Supp. 3d 907 (D. Colo. 2019) 
(customized wedding websites); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890 
(Ariz. 2019) (wedding invitations); Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (App. Div. 2016) 
(wedding venue); see also Laycock, supra note 3, at 58. 
 11. Laycock, supra note 3, at 53. 
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proxies for and expressions of their speech and should be protected as such.12  
The outcome of these cases therefore depends on whether and to what degree 
a reviewing court is willing to treat business activity as expressive speech.13 
This Note analyzes two overarching issues integral to the line of wedding 
vendor cases.  First, whether commercial goods and services provided by 
wedding vendors are indeed “expressive” under the First Amendment.  
Second, if so, what is the appropriate level of scrutiny to balance the equities 
on either side?  The answers to these questions ultimately determine the 
winner between two competing values:  antidiscrimination and religious 
liberty. 
Part I provides the cultural and legal backdrop framing the speech issues 
this Note examines.  It explains how Supreme Court precedent leveled First 
Amendment free exercise claims.  Consequently, parties who conceptually 
seek to freely exercise their religion must couch their claims in terms of free 
speech under the compelled speech doctrine.  Part II analyzes apposite cases 
that conflict on whether wedding services and goods are speech under the 
First Amendment and, if so, which level of scrutiny courts should apply to 
review the challenged law.  Part III suggests that when wedding proprietors’ 
goods and services satisfy the “inherently expressive test,” courts should then 
apply intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the challenged law passes 
constitutional muster.  Arguably, that two-part suggestion poses two hurdles 
for the paradigmatic religious vendor.  Accordingly, Part III recommends a 
separate legislative solution to support the free exercise of religion. 
I.  THE RISE OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND THE FALL OF FREE EXERCISE:  
A FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH PUZZLE 
The wedding vendor cases are the product of two phenomenaprogress 
for LGBTQIA+14 rights and concomitant restraint placed on the First 
Amendment right to freely exercise religion.  Part I.A suggests that 
Obergefell v. Hodges15 launched the uptick in wedding vendor litigation by 
aggravating cultural tensions between proponents of marriage equality and 
those with religious objections to same-sex marriage.  Part I.B examines case 
law scrutinizing neutral laws of general applicability16 that, as applied, 
burden First Amendment liberties such as religion and speech.  In doing so, 
 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. This acronym stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, 
intersex, and ally or asexual.  The plus sign indicates that the acronym is nonexhaustive. 
Michael Gold, The ABCs of L.G.B.T.Q.I.A.+, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/style/lgbtq-gender-language.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9AX2-UVHF]. 
 15. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 16. A neutral law of general applicability is one that “appears to be about a non-rights-
implicating matter of public health, safety, and the like,” rather than one suggesting that “the 
state is up to some nefarious purpose.” Abner S. Greene, Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop:  
Some Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. REV. 667, 672 (2019).  In other words, the law does 
not target a particular group, impose specific conduct, or aim to regulate a protected right like 
religion. 
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Part I.B points out that the wedding vendors discussed in Part II have every 
incentive to plead their cases as compelled speech claims, instead of free 
exercise challenges, because the former are given greater constitutional 
latitude than the latter.  Part I.C couples the analyses in Parts I.A and I.B 
using Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission17 to 
(1) highlight the issues raised in the wedding vendor cases, (2) note how the 
Supreme Court ultimately dodged answering them, and (3) explain why 
courts are invoking different modes of analysis in the case’s aftermath. 
A.  Marriage Equality and Religious Objectors:  A Cultural and Legal 
Dispute 
The Supreme Court established the right to same-sex marriage in 2015.18  
In Obergefell, the Court ruled that marriage is a fundamental right and applies 
equally to opposite-sex and same-sex couples.19  Accordingly, Obergefell 
obligated all fifty states to legalize same-sex marriage.  In practice, the case 
overturned same-sex marriage bans in thirteen states and vindicated same-
sex marriages in the remaining thirty-seven.20  Then President Barack Obama 
declared the ruling a “victory for America.”21  In short, Obergefell ushered 
in a new wave for LGBTQIA+ progressmarriage equality. 
However, “[i]t’s as true in culture as it is in physics:  [f]or any action, there 
is an equal and opposite reaction.”22  After Obergefell, cultural objections to 
same-sex marriage increased, in part out of concern for safeguarding 
traditional beliefs concerning marriage and family life.23  Those cultural 
objections have taken root in the growing line of wedding vendor cases.24  
Accordingly, Obergefell heightened the friction between two rights:  same-
sex marriage on one side and liberty to object vis-à-vis religious expression 
on the other. 
Being a more or less well-oiled machine, the Supreme Court immediately 
harnessed that friction within the context of constitutional rights.  In a pointed 
 
 17. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 18. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05. 
 19. Id. (“The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right 
to marry.”). 
 20. Bill Chappell, Supreme Court Declares Same-Sex Marriage Legal in All 50 States, 
NPR (June 26, 2015, 10:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/ 
06/26/417717613/supreme-court-rules-all-states-must-allow-same-sex-marriages [https:// 
perma.cc/G26X-GBBZ]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Emma Green, America Moved On from Its Gay-Rights Movementand Left a Legal 
Mess Behind, ATLANTIC (Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2019/08/lgbtq-rights-america-arent-resolved/596287/ [https://perma.cc/V8AT-VD95]. 
 23. See CARLOS A. BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY:  A CONTENTIOUS 
HISTORY 154 (2017) (“As the breadth of LGBT equality measures expanded, social and 
religious conservatives began to sound the alarm about what that expansion meant for those 
who morally object to same-sex sexual conduct and relationships.”); see also Green, supra 
note 22 (“[P]ublic support for people refusing to serve LGBTQ people when it violates their 
religious beliefs has crept up steadily:  [a]lmost a third of Americans . . . say this should be 
legal, compared with 16 percent . . . in 2014.”). 
 24. See supra note 10 (collecting recent wedding vendor cases). 
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dissent, Chief Justice John Roberts highlighted the legal implications of the 
majority opinion in Obergefell.25  Chief Justice Roberts discussed how the 
ruling would constrain First Amendment rights to free exercise and speech.26  
He also warned that “hard questions” would come to the Court after 
Obergefell, “when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may be seen 
to conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage.”27  In sum, Obergefell 
set the stage for a reflection of growing cultural tensions in the 
lawmarriage equality and the ability to realize that right versus religious 
liberty to object under the First Amendment. 
B.  Neutral Laws of General Applicability and the First Amendment:  An 
Idiosyncratic Development 
Although the legal tension raised in Part I.A implicates the First 
Amendment right to free exercise,28 religious objectors in the wedding 
vendor cases instead rely on a free speech claim to bring their cases to court.29  
Considering a free exercise claim both intuitively and conceptually fits the 
bill, why the First Amendment quirk? 
1.  The Not so Free Right to Exercise Religion:  Employment Division v. 
Smith and Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 
In Employment Division v. Smith,30 the Supreme Court leveled the First 
Amendment right to free exercise.31  In that case, members of the Native 
American Church challenged Oregon’s criminal ban on peyote, claiming the 
law interfered with their religious practices.32  The Court held that the Oregon 
law, though it incidentally interfered with the right to free exercise, was 
nevertheless constitutional.33  Smith set the precedent that when a law is 
 
 25. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624–26 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 26. Id. at 2625 (“Today’s decision . . . creates serious questions about religious liberty.  
Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith . . . spelled out in 
the [First Amendment].”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”).  As detailed, the First Amendment also contains anti-establishment, 
free press, and free association protections.  However, this Note will only address the 
protections granted under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. 
 29. See infra Parts I.C, II (discussing the wedding vendors’ compelled speech claims). 
 30. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 31. Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination 
Campaigns Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:  EMERGING 
CONFLICTS 103, 105 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (noting that Smith “leveled the ‘free 
exercise’ of religion by making it subordinate to any governmental objective so long as it was 
nominally rational and evenhanded”). 
 32. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 33. Id. at 879 (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation 
to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” (quoting 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))). 
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neutral and of general applicability—a law that regulates something other 
than religion or a religious group yet, as applied, incidentally interferes with 
a religious practice—a reviewing court ought to apply rational basis 
scrutiny.34  In practice, Smith makes a free exercise claim unavailable to 
aggrieved parties when a law incidentally burdens their religion because the 
standard of review applied to the law is deferential.35  Pertinent to this Note, 
the antidiscrimination laws challenged by the wedding vendors in Part II are 
neutral laws of general applicability and, accordingly, Smith’s rational basis 
is the standard in play. 
In Smith, the Court exercised judicial restraint because it applied a law-
favoring, deferential level of scrutiny to give effect to the state’s policy 
decision.36  The legal process school articulates that different branches of 
government have different kinds of “institutional competence.”37  When a 
nascent public policy issue surfaces, the best-positioned branch to resolve the 
problem should, indeed, promulgate its solution.38  In the context of 
“complex social problems,” the legislative branch is best suited to enact a 
solution.39  Legislators can engage with and scrutinize the problem with a 
holistic eye, whereas a judge can rule on the social issue only on a case-by-
case basis.40  When a legislator does aim to rectify a social ill, the procedure 
legitimizes the measure,41 and a reviewing court thus may be inclined to defer 
to legislators to advance social policy.42  That said, the Smith Court upheld 
Oregon’s statute banning peyote because it was concerned about the state’s 
legitimate interest in banning narcotics.43 
 
 34. When a law conflicts with a constitutionally protected right, a court will use various 
“levels of scrutiny” to determine whether the law is unconstitutional. See ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 564–68 (5th ed. 2015) 
(discussing the origin, significance, and application of the levels of scrutiny).  The review 
boils down to two steps.  First, the court determines the appropriate level of scrutiny, for 
example, more deferential or demanding, which depends on whether the law indirectly or 
directly burdens a constitutional right. Id. at 565.  Second, the court applies that standard to 
“scrutinize” (1) the interest the law serves and (2) how the law, in practice, achieves that 
interest. Id. at 565–67.  If the law satisfies the two prongs of the second step under the 
applicable standard, it is constitutional. Id. at 568. 
 35. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.  However, when a law targets a 
particular religion, religious group, or practice—in other words, the law is not facially neutral 
and of general applicability—the law is subject to strict scrutiny, a more demanding standard 
of review. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 
(1993); infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny). 
 36. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–86.  For discussion of rational basis as a less demanding 
level of scrutiny, see Greene, supra note 16, at 667 n.3. 
 37. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction 
to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li, lx (1994). 
 38. See id. at lx. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at liii. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–86 (1990). 
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Nevertheless, Smith is a highly controversial opinion.44  After the Supreme 
Court handed down Smith, Congress, by a unanimous House and 97-3 Senate 
vote, passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199345 (RFRA), 
which “prohibits the government from burdening religious exercise unless it 
meets a high level of legal scrutiny.”46  Organizations across the political 
spectrum championed the RFRA as reversing Smith to protect Americans of 
all faiths.47  In practice, the RFRA “overturned” Smith by changing the 
scrutiny analysis from rational basis to strict scrutiny, the most exacting 
standard of review.48  Accordingly, the RFRA appeared poised to make it 
substantially harder for the government to incidentally interfere with the right 
to free exercise across the board. 
However, shortly after its enactment, the Supreme Court held that applying 
the RFRA to state action went beyond Congress’s power and that it was 
unconstitutional as applied to states.49  Therefore, while the RFRA’s 
application to a federal action stands,50 the Court left its holding in Smith 
intact at the state level.51 
In response, twenty-one states have adopted their own religious freedom 
acts (“state RFRAs”),52 which are essentially identical to the RFRA.53  A 
variety of believers, such as Sikhs, Apache, Muslims, and Jews have 
successfully invoked the RFRA to overcome government-sanctioned barriers 
to their religious practices.54  However, while state RFRAs gained traction in 
 
 44. See Dennis P. Hollinger, Religious Freedom, Civil Rights, and Sexuality:  A Christian 
Ethics Perspective, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON 
GROUND 56, 58–59 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2019) (“[Smith] 
effectively asserts that a person can believe anything, but cannot necessarily live it out.  In 
other words, religious beliefs should be protected, but not the actions stemming from those 
beliefs, for they are perceived to encroach on civil rights in a pluralistic society.” (footnote 
omitted)); see also Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court 2017 TermForeword:  Rights as 
Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 121 (2018). 
 45. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 46. Travis Weber, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs):  What Are They 
and Why Are They Needed?, FAM. RES. COUNCIL, https://www.frc.org/issuebrief/state-
religious-freedom-restoration-acts-rfras-what-are-they-and-why-are-they-needed 
[https://perma.cc/2DH6-QKM6] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 47. CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 16. 
 48. When a court applies strict scrutiny, it is often fatal to the challenged law because 
burdens on constitutional rights must overcome a high bar. See, e.g., id. at 38–39. 
 49. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–36 (1997). 
 50. See id. at 536. 
 51. Id. 
 52. This figure is current as of 2016. See generally STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
RESTORATION ACTS:  A COMPILATION OF ENACTED AND RECENTLY PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
(William H. Manz ed., 2016); see also Weber, supra note 46. 
 53. Religious Freedom Restoration Act Information Central, BECKET L., 
https://www.becketlaw.org/research-central/rfra-info-central/ [https://perma.cc/LKK4-
WARV] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (noting that a successful RFRA claim must satisfy three 
requirements:  (1) the complaining party has “a sincere belief that is being substantially 
burdened” and (2) the government does not have a compelling interest that interferes with the 
belief or, if it does, (3) the measure substantially burdening the religious belief is not the least 
restrictive means). 
 54. See CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 17. 
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the 1990s–2000s, they have received severe negative press suggesting that 
they target same-sex marriage.55  Following this federalism tug-of-war, a free 
exercise claim is “unavailable” to a burdened party in a state that has not 
enacted its own religious freedom act because a law incidentally burdening 
religion will receive deference.  In popular media, religious freedom acts 
today stand as a cultural flashpoint.56 
2.  Free Speech and the Compelled Speech Doctrine:  An Overview 
With a federal free exercise claim a dead end, an aggrieved party has every 
incentive to couch their First Amendment claim within free speech, a “classic 
trump.”57  The touchstone of free speech is personal autonomy, which is a 
fundamental right.58  This fundamental right is multifaceted.59  The right to 
speak equally covers the right to refrain from speaking.60  The right to refrain 
from speaking, in part, prevents the harms of unwanted expression, 
association, endorsement, and attribution to promote personal autonomy.61 
The compelled speech doctrine, a subset of free speech jurisprudence, 
explicitly protects the right to refrain from speaking.62  As reflected in the 
 
 55. Id. at 17–18 (discussing the strong opposition of national sports leagues, musicians, 
and business leaders to Indiana’s proposed religious freedom act in 2015 as a product of 
political timing in the wake of marriage equality). 
 56. Id. at 19; see In the News:  What RFRA Is Really About, ALLIANCE DEFENDING 
FREEDOM, https://adflegal.org/detailspages/faith-and-justice-details/what-rfra-is-really-about 
[https://perma.cc/7YFV-5E4T] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 57. Greene, supra note 44, at 36.  However, not all words, creative forms, or modes of 
expression fall within “Free Speech Clause territory.” Greene, supra note 16, at 677 
(discussing whether expression is covered by the Free Speech Clause, i.e., whether it is 
sufficient to bring the First Amendment into play).  For further discussion on the difference 
between speech, its corollaries, and what falls into the Free Speech Clause’s ambit, see Leslie 
Kendrick, Use Your Words:  On the “Speech” in “Freedom of Speech,” 116 MICH. L. REV. 
667, 686–93 (2018) (“‘[S]peech’ refers to a phenomenon in the world . . . .  The phrase ‘the 
freedom of speech’ is a term of art, one that does not track people’s [colloquial] understanding 
of the word ‘speech.’ . . .  [I]t excludes some forms of ‘speech’ (insider trading, etc.) and it 
includes some nonspeech (music, abstract art, flag burning, etc.).”).  See also Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Speech or Conduct?:  The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 
241, 270 (2015) (“A very expansive category of [expressive conduct] also risks diluting 
potential protection for that category.”). 
 58. STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 37 (2008) (“[F]ree speech is 
an inherent right which is rooted in human dignity and autonomy.”). 
 59. See id. (explaining that free speech “give[s] rise to other fundamental rights, including 
personal security, privacy, reputation, citizenship, and equality” (emphasis added)). 
 60. Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
1475, 1480 (2018). 
 61. See id. at 1494 (“Connecting or associating me with unwanted messages is a harm to 
my ability to construct my self in part through my expressive acts.  It affects both how the 
world sees me and how I see myself.” (emphasis added)). 
 62. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (invalidating a New Hampshire 
law making it a misdemeanor to obscure the state motto “Live Free or Die” on noncommercial 
license plates).  “[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against 
state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at 
all.” Id.; see also, e.g., Nat’l. Inst. Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376–
78 (2018) (holding that a state law requiring health clinics to post notices about low-cost and 
free abortions compels speech); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) 
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seminal case West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,63 the 
compelled speech doctrine aims to restrict the government from foisting 
unwanted messages, ideologies, beliefs, or statements onto people.64  The 
compelled speech doctrine, in part, prevents the harm of connecting to, 
associating with, or otherwise attributing to a person a particular idea to 
which that person otherwise would not ascribe but for the threat of legal 
sanctions.65  Thus, the compelled speech doctrine gives people the right to 
choose which messages are, and are not, “made in their name.”66 
Barnette and its progeny stand for the proposition that when the object of 
a law is to impose speech, the measure is subject to strict scrutiny.67  The 
reason being that a facial mandate of speech effectively “alters the content of 
the speech.”68  When a law is on the books to function “as a content-based 
[speech] regulation,”69 it is inherently pernicious70 and a demanding level of 
scrutiny is thus warranted. 
However, when the purpose of a law is to oblige something other than 
speech, yet as applied it incidentally burdens speech,71 the standard of review 
is less clear.72  Part of the confusion, and relevant to the wedding vendor 
cases, stems from the question of whether the contested good, service, or 
activity is “expressive” enough to bring a free speech analysis into play.73  
To sort out those queries in the wedding vendor cases detailed in Part II, 
courts analogize to one of two compelled speech cases:  Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.74 or Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR).75 
 
(invalidating a state law mandating students to salute the flag and state the pledge of 
allegiance). 
 63. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 64. Id. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, 
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”). 
 65. Greene, supra note 16, at 683. 
 66. See Greene, supra note 60, at 1478 (discussing the freedom of disassociation). 
 67. See Greene, supra note 16, at 672. 
 68. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (holding 
state-mandated sponsorship disclosures unconstitutional). 
 69. Id. (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (holding a 
state law requiring newspapers to provide political candidates a “right of reply” 
unconstitutional)). 
 70. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (discussing the 
crucial nature of free dissemination of ideas). 
 71. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing whether activity is sufficiently 
expressive to warrant a free speech analysis); see also infra Part III. 
 72. As in the free exercise realm, the Supreme Court also distinguishes between laws that 
facially compel speech and those that are neutral and of general applicability. See PruneYard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87–88 (1980) (collecting cases).  However, as this 
section explains, the Supreme Court’s precedent guiding the level of scrutiny analysis for 
facially neutral laws, within the context of a free speech claim, is murky. 
 73. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 74. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 75. 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
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In Hurley, the Supreme Court held a “peculiar”76 application of a state 
antidiscrimination law77 was unconstitutional under the compelled speech 
doctrine.78  Here, St. Patrick’s Day parade organizers refused to allow GLIB, 
an Irish, gay affinity group in Boston, to participate in the parade as a 
sponsor.79  The Court reasoned that an application of the challenged law in 
this context would foist a message onto the parade that the council had 
“clearly decided to exclude.”80  Further, the Court stated that the law would 
require the “speakers to modify the content of their expression,”81 violating 
“the general rule of speaker’s autonomy.”82  The Court found the law 
unconstitutionally compelled the organizers’ expression even though it was 
facially neutral.83 
Although the antidiscrimination law burdened expression incidentally, the 
Court arguably treated the law as if it facially compelled expression.84  
Hurley does not explicitly engage in a level of scrutiny analysis.85  Yet, the 
case proposes that when an application of an otherwise neutral law treats 
“speech itself to be the public accommodation,”86 a more exacting standard 
of review like that deployed in Barnette should apply.87 
The Court likely protected the organizers’ speech so vigorously for two 
reasons.  First, the Court was concerned about such a broad application88 of 
a public accommodations law, which traditionally covers inns, theaters, and 
other similar places open to the public.89  It discussed at length that a parade 
is of such an “expressive character”90 that treating the parade itself like a 
 
 76. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. 
 77. The plaintiffs challenged a public accommodations law that prohibited discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2020).  A public 
accommodations law is a state measure aiming to regulate places open to the public, like an 
inn, theater, or restaurant. See BALL, supra note 23, at 200.  Thus, a public accommodations 
law is a neutral law of general applicability. Id. 
 78. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581. 
 79. Id. at 561. 
 80. Id. at 574. 
 81. Id. at 578 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (“On its face, the object of the law is to ensure by statute for gays and lesbians 
desiring to make use of public accommodations . . . they will not be turned away.”). 
 84. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Greene, supra note 16, at 675 (“Hurley does not mention levels of scrutiny.  Once 
the Court determined that the ‘peculiar’ application of the state law would require the 
organizers to alter their parade message, the case was over.”). 
 86. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
 87. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 88. See BALL, supra note 23, at 200 (noting that a parade is not a public accommodation 
in the traditional sense and so applying an antidiscrimination law in that context is arguably a 
reach). 
 89. Id. (“The controversy in Hurley initially arose because of the broad reach of the state’s 
public accommodation law as interpreted by the state courts.  It can be argued that private 
parades should not be included within the scope of civil rights statutes.”). 
 90. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
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public accommodation was improper.91  The Court explained the organizers 
did not wish to exclude members of GLIB from attending the parade; rather, 
they wanted to exclude GLIB as a “parade unit carrying its own banner.”92  
The distinction is subtle but important.  The Court seemed to imply that if 
the organizers did not allow GLIB members to attend the parade at all, unlike 
other members of the Boston public, they would violate the 
antidiscrimination law.93  However, the organizers could exclude GLIB from 
the live, expressive activity occurring within the parade itself, i.e., the parade 
proper.94  The Court deemed the state’s application of the antidiscrimination 
law in this context illegitimate because it regulated the parade proper instead 
of regulating the public’s access to the parade.95  Second, the Court engaged 
in a brief, yet telling, discussion describing a parade as a quintessential mode 
of expression protected by the First Amendment.96  The Court compared a 
parade to a “protest march”97 and its organizers to an archetypical political 
activist “who takes to the street corner to express his views.”98  Compelling 
the organizers to express GLIB’s message would be equally 
unconstitutional.99  Therefore, the parade organizers won the case, despite 
the antidiscrimination law being facially valid.100 
In FAIR,101 the Supreme Court held that the Solomon Amendment—a 
federal law that required law schools to host military recruiters on campus—
did not compel the schools’ speech.102  Congress passed the Solomon 
Amendment in direct response to schools restricting the military’s access to 
on-campus recruiting because of the schools’ disagreement with the 
military’s official “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.103  Although the Solomon 
Amendment did not facially regulate the schools’ speech, the case presented 
a strong argument that it did as applied because the schools would have 
refused hosting the recruiters but for the superseding law.  A “stepped-up”104 
 
 91. Id. at 572 (“[T]he Massachusetts law has been applied in a peculiar way.”); see 
Greene, supra note 16, at 677 n.47 (discussing more strategic and intuitive ways 
Massachusetts could have held the organizers liable). 
 92. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. 
 93. See id. at 578. 
 94. Id. (“When the law is applied to expressive activity in the way it was done here, its 
apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression to 
whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own.”). 
 95. Id. at 573. 
 96. See id. at 577–79. 
 97. Id. at 577. 
 98. Id. at 579. 
 99. Id.; see BALL, supra note 23, at 200 (“[The Court] determined that it was reasonable 
to believe that members of the public would perceive GLIB’s participation in the parade as 
resulting from the council’s support for, or approval of, the gay group’s message.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 100. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579. 
 101. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 102. Id. at 51.  The Solomon Amendment required schools to “offer military recruiters the 
same access to its campus and students that it provides to the nonmilitary recruiter receiving 
the most favorable access” in order to receive federal funding. Id. at 55. 
 103. Id. at 55. 
 104. See Greene, supra note 16, at 673. 
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review could have been applied in light of Hurley.  However, the Court 
rejected that notion. 
Instead, the Court reasoned that, as a threshold matter, the schools’ 
“expressive” activity did not rise to the level of constitutional speech or 
expression.105  The Court ruled that hosting military recruiters does not 
compel literal “speech.”106  Although school officials communicated with the 
recruiters via email, the Court refused to treat administrative emails as First 
Amendment protected speech.107  Further, the Court stated the government 
can limit “speech” when it facilitates conduct that the government has the 
authority to regulate.108  The Court found that the incidental compelled 
speech elements of the case in FAIR were a “far cry” from Barnette and its 
progeny.109 
Next, the Court addressed Hurley’s implications when a law incidentally 
imposes on expression.  The Court acknowledged that sufficiently expressive 
conduct could warrant First Amendment protection under the compelled 
speech doctrine.110  At that point in its opinion, the Court could have deferred 
to precedent, Hurley, and found that the Solomon Amendment compelled the 
schools to convey an unwanted message. 
Instead, the Court declined to treat the schools’ activity as expressive at 
all.111  The Court borrowed from the “symbolic speech” lines of cases to test 
whether the schools’ implicated activity was expressive enough to bring free 
speech in play.112  Relying on the seminal cases United States v. O’Brien113 
and Texas v. Johnson,114 which involved draft-card and flag burning 
respectively, the Court defined quintessential “symbolic speech.”115  The 
Court ruled that when conduct is “inherently expressive,”116 meaning the 
conduct conveys an “overwhelmingly apparent”117 message, it is entitled to 
First Amendment protections.118 
 
 105. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 62 (reasoning that protecting such emails under the First Amendment would 
trivialize the freedom protected in Barnette and its progeny). 
 108. Id.  “Congress, for example, can prohibit employers from discriminating in hiring on 
the basis of race.  The fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign reading 
‘White Applicants Only’ hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating the 
employer’s speech rather than conduct.” Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 63 (“Our compelled-speech cases are not limited to the situation in which an 
individual must personally speak the government’s message.”). 
 111. Id. at 65. 
 112. See id. (“Having rejected the view that the Solomon Amendment impermissibly 
regulates speech, we must still consider whether the expressive nature of the conduct regulated 
by the statute brings that conduct within the First Amendment’s protection.”). 
 113. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 114. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 115. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406).  In determining whether a message is 
“overwhelmingly apparent,” a court should consider “the context in which it occurred.” 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407. 
 118. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66. 
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Applying those principles to the facts in FAIR, the Court concluded that 
the Solomon Amendment did not violate the First Amendment because the 
schools’ conduct was not sufficiently expressive.119  The Court reasoned that 
schools’ decision to host the military or not did not send the clear message 
that the schools agreed or disagreed with the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy.120  The Court rejected the schools’ argument that, because the schools 
intended to express a message through their conduct, the Court should protect 
that conduct as First Amendment expression.121  The Court reasoned that an 
intent to express does not warrant free speech protection; rather, a clear 
message must follow the intention, which the schools lacked.122  The Court 
resolved the case on the threshold question of whether the activity was speech 
or otherwise expressive conduct but did not engage in a level of scrutiny 
analysis.123 
The compelled speech doctrine has two implications when a law 
incidentally burdens speech, expression, or expressive conduct.  First, the 
case law provides a guidepost to determine when a form of expression is 
sufficient to fall within the First Amendment’s coverage.124  Second, the case 
law suggests two tiers of scrutiny may be applicable when a law incidentally 
interferes with expressive conductHurley may suggest an exacting 
standard of review,125 whereas FAIR may suggest something more 
deferential,126 like the intermediate scrutiny employed in O’Brien and 
Johnson.  This Note suggests that the distinction between the cases is the 
nature of the governments’ interest.  In FAIR, the Solomon Amendment was 
linked to the government’s ability to raise a military, an arguably strong 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
An observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away from the law school has 
no way of knowing whether the law school is expressing its disapproval of the 
military, all the law school’s interview rooms are full, or the military recruiters 
decided for reasons of their own that they would rather interview someplace else. 
Id. 
 121. Id. at 66–67. 
 122. Id. (noting that O’Brien states that an intent to express a message does not itself 
necessitate a free speech analysis); see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) 
(“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 123. If the schools’ activity did satisfy the inherently expressive test of expressive conduct, 
the Court would have applied intermediate scrutiny under O’Brien. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.  
Intermediate scrutiny is a less demanding standard than strict scrutiny.  See Greene, supra note 
16, at 672.  The Court applies a more deferential standard because the government has a “freer 
hand” in restricting “expressive conduct”; it involves speech and nonspeech elements, the 
latter of which are not explicitly protected under the First Amendment. Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
 124. Compare FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65–67 (applying expressive conduct case law), with 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 577–79 (1995) 
(discussing pure, classic expression). 
 125. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.  “[W]e have limited the applicability of O’Brien’s 
relatively lenient standard to those cases in which ‘the governmental interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). 
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interest.127  However in Hurley, the broad reach of the public 
accommodations law colored, and thus weakened, the government’s interest 
in preventing discrimination.128 
The issues of when conduct is sufficiently expressive to fall into the First 
Amendment’s coverage and the applicable standard of review foreground the 
highly contested line of wedding vendor cases. 
C.  Masterpiece CakeshopFree Exercise Is Born Again Under Compelled 
Speech 
As religious objection met the realization of marriage equality, the line of 
compelled speech claims from wedding vendors began to proliferate.129  
Those cases proposed several perplexing First Amendment questions.  First, 
are wedding goods and services expressive?  Are they so expressive as to 
invoke the First Amendment?  If the wedding vendor’s various activities are 
sufficiently expressive under the First Amendment, would holding the 
vendors in violation of antidiscrimination laws when they refuse service for 
same-sex weddings compel their speech?  If yes, which standard of review 
would apply to the antidiscrimination laws, given that they are facially 
neutral public accommodations laws?  When the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission,130 the Court seemed primed to answer these questions.131 
The facts in Masterpiece Cakeshop were representative of the broader line 
of wedding vendor cases.132  Here, Jack Phillips owned and operated 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado.133  Charlie Craig and Dave 
Mullins, a gay couple, visited the bakery to place an order for their wedding 
cake.134  Mr. Phillips refused the request on religious grounds.135  
Subsequently, Mr. Craig and Mr. Mullins filed a complaint with the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission, the reviewing body tasked to review charges of 
antidiscrimination, against Mr. Phillips and his bakery.136  Mr. Craig and Mr. 
 
 127. See supra note 102 (discussing the Solomon Amendment). 
 128. See supra notes 88–91 (discussing the broad, “peculiar” application of the 
antidiscrimination law to the parade). 
 129. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (involving a 
wedding photographer who refused services for a lesbian couple’s wedding); Gifford v. 
McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (App. Div. 2016) (involving wedding venue owners who refused 
to host a lesbian couple’s wedding); Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 
(Or. Ct. App. 2017) (involving a bakery owner who refused to take a wedding cake request 
from a lesbian couple), review denied, 363 Or. 224 (2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019). 
 130. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 131. See id. at 1723. (“The case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation 
of at least two principles.  The first is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to 
protect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face 
discrimination when they seek goods or services.  The second is the right of all persons to 
exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment . . . .”). 
 132. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 133. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1723. 
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Mullins claimed Mr. Phillips violated the Colorado Anti-discrimination Act 
(CADA), which prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation 
and lists “sexual orientation” as a protected category.137  After a lengthy 
appeals process, the case made its way to the Supreme Court.  The issue of 
whether a wedding cake is sufficiently expressive to trigger a compelled 
speech analysis took up the most “briefing space”138 on appeal.139 
Though the issues outlined above were ripe for review, the Court “found 
itself an exit ramp.”140  Instead of deciding the case on the merits, the Court 
held the record made by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission was infected 
with religious animus in violation of the Free Exercise Clause, reversing the 
case for Mr. Phillips.141  The Court took issue with three instances of 
religious hostilitytwo sets of statements made by members of the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission142 and the commission’s different treatment of Mr. 
Phillips as compared to other bakers, who the Commission held could refuse 
to bake cakes on conscience grounds.143  The Court concluded that “cases 
like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, 
all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with 
tolerance.”144  In short, Masterpiece Cakeshop stands for the proposition that 
 
 137. Id. at 1725. 
 138. See Greene, supra note 16, at 667. 
 139. Mr. Phillips argued the Free Speech Clause should protect his cake production because 
the cakes were a form of artistic expression that reflected his personal celebration of a 
marriage. Brief for Petitioners at 12–14, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).  
Mr. Phillips concluded that the CADA mandated the content of his expression and, relying on 
Riley, would fail under strict scrutiny. Id. at 19; see supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text 
(discussing Riley).  In contrast, the government argued intermediate scrutiny should apply, at 
most, because the CADA regulates Mr. Phillips’s discriminatory conduct, posing an incidental 
burden on his “expression.” Brief for Respondent Colorado Civil Rights Commission at 17–
18, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
 140. Greene, supra note 44, at 122. 
 141. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (“When the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission considered this case, it did not do so with the religious neutrality that the 
Constitution requires.”). 
 142. The first two involved specific statements made by members of the commission.  The 
Court described the first:  “Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to believe’ but cannot act on 
his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state.’” Id. at 1729.  In the second 
instance the commissioner stated:  “[R]eligion has been used to justify all kinds of 
discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust . . . we 
can list hundreds of situations . . . .  [I]t is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric . . . .” 
Id. 
 143. Id. at 1730.  The Court noted that in prior cases, the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission held that bakers did not violate the CADA when they refused to create cakes that 
conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, a conscience-based objection inversely 
analogous to that of Mr. Phillips. Id.  However, in those cases, the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission reasoned the bakers did not discriminate against the customer because the bakers 
would still provide other goods, like birthday cakes and cookies, to the customer. Id.  Yet, the 
Court found the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not apply that favorable rationale to 
Mr. Phillips. Id.  Instead, the commission applied a new rule—Mr. Phillips’s refusal was an 
act of discrimination and not an exercise of religious objection because the requested cake 
would carry Mr. Craig and Mr. Mullins’s message. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1732. 
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a reviewing body, there, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, must 
impartially decide cases implicating religious liberty.145 
Notably, however, Justice Clarence Thomas went on to analyze the free 
speech aspect of the case in his dissenting opinion.146  First, Justice Thomas 
ruled Mr. Phillips’ cake making was sufficiently expressive conduct to bring 
the First Amendment into play because wedding cakes are inherently 
symbolic.147  Then, Justice Thomas analogized the case to Hurley by 
comparing the symbolism of wedding cakes to that of parades, finding a 
demanding level of scrutiny applies to the CADA.148  Justice Thomas did not 
decide whether the CADA would satisfy strict scrutiny.149  However, Justice 
Thomas advised that an individual’s adherence to a minority view is a strong 
reason to give the individual even greater protection.150  He specifically 
noted that Mr. Phillips was in the minority post-Obergefell.151  Justice 
Thomas’s analysis is important because lower courts have relied on it to 
resolve wedding vendors’ free speech claims by treating the vendors’ goods 
or services as speech and then fatally apply strict scrutiny to the 
antidiscrimination law.152 
Nevertheless, Masterpiece Cakeshop could have helped resolve the 
tension between religious liberty and marriage equality but frankly did very 
little to offer clear, precedential guidance.153  As detailed in Part II, the 
wedding vendor cases continue to arise.  Without Supreme Court 
guidance,154 the lower courts are employing different modes of analysis and 
are coming to opposite conclusions despite analogous facts.  In light of the 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1742–47 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. at 1742–43. 
 148. Id. at 1744. 
 149. Id. at 1746. 
 150. Justice Thomas’s reasoning echoes that of the “famous footnote” four of United States 
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, 
at 565 (noting that footnote four advises courts to apply varying levels of review depending 
on the constitutional assertion).  “[A] ‘more searching judicial inquiry’ is appropriate when it 
is . . . a law that discriminates against a ‘discrete and insular minority.’” Id. (quoting Carolene 
Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4). 
 151. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1747 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that courts 
should not deploy the First Amendment to criticize views and should apply the First 
Amendment to protect different views); see supra Part I.A (discussing Obergefell and its 
cultural implications). 
 152. See infra Part II.A. 
 153. See Mark L. Movsesian, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom, 
42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 750 (2019) (“Masterpiece Cakeshop is a narrow decision.  
The case turns on rather unique facts and does little to resolve conflicts between our anti-
discrimination laws, on the one hand, and our commitment to religious freedom, on the other.  
But the narrowness of the case’s holding is deceptive.  In fact, Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects 
very broad cultural and political trends that drive those conflicts and shape their 
resolution . . . .”). 
 154. But see supra note 146 (discussing Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion).  Part II 
suggests some courts are taking up Justice Thomas’s analysis by first treating goods and 
services as speech and then applying strict scrutiny to the antidiscrimination law. 
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petition for certiorari docketed for State v. Arlene’s Flowers Inc.,155 the 
“dodge”156 made in Masterpiece Cakeshop “won’t work for long.”157 
II.  TWO COMPETING PARADIGMS:  PURE SPEECH AND STRICT SCRUTINY 
VERSUS SUFFICIENTLY UNEXPRESSIVE BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
Masterpiece Cakeshop highlights two crucial but unresolved First 
Amendment issues in the line of wedding vendor cases.  First, is business 
activity that arguably has expressive elements sufficiently expressive to fall 
within the Free Speech Clause?  Second, if so, how should a presiding court 
review a facially neutral antidiscrimination law that, as applied, incidentally 
burdens vendors’ expression?  The first question is a threshold inquiry and a 
crucial analytical step for a presiding court.  The second question guides 
courts in balancing the equities of antidiscrimination and religious liberty vis-
à-vis expression.  Part II.A provides two cases where the courts find vendors’ 
activities to be speech and then apply strict scrutiny.  In those cases, the 
antidiscrimination laws did not pass constitutional muster.  Part II.B provides 
a third case, representative of a split from those cases discussed in Part II.A, 
where the court more closely scrutinized the vendor’s activity and did not 
find it to be “speech” at all.  Accordingly, the court did not reach the second 
balancing portion of the inquiry. 
A.  Compelled “Pure” Speech and Strict Scrutiny 
This section examines two cases decided after Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
which represent one approach courts take to resolve a compelled speech 
claim in the wedding vendor cases.  First, the courts have treated the vendors’ 
services as pure speech, not expressive conduct or unexpressive business 
activity.  Then, tracking Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, they have applied strict scrutiny to the challenged 
antidiscrimination law.158  This two-step analysis has yielded one 
paradigmatic side in the wedding vendor divide.159 
1.  Telescope Media Group v. Lucero 
In Telescope Media Group v. Lucero,160 the Eighth Circuit held that 
wedding video producers have a right to provide their services to opposite-
sex couples only.161  Here, Angel and Carl Larsen, who own Telescope 
Media Group (“Telescope”), a for-profit Minnesota corporation, sought to 
 
 155. 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (No. 19-
333). 
 156. Greene, supra note 44, at 122. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1742–46 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); supra note 146 (discussing Justice Thomas’s 
expressive speech analysis). 
 159. See supra Part II.B (examining the second paradigm). 
 160. 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 161. Id. at 754. 
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enjoin the government from enforcing pertinent provisions of the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act162 (MHRA) against them.  The Larsens challenged the 
MHRA provisions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation163 because they wanted to begin producing wedding videos but 
for opposite-sex couples only.164  As devout Christians, the Larsens 
characterized their faith as requiring them to carry God’s message in all they 
do165 and they intended to promote Christian ideals166 in the wake of 
marriage equality.167  The Larsens conceded the videos would initially be 
inspired by their clients’ ideas, but their own creativity and editorial decisions 
produced the final message.168  In short, the Larsens argued the MHRA laws 
would compel them to speak favorably for same-sex weddings when they 
could not in good conscience.169 
Although the MHRA is a facially neutral public accommodations law, the 
court found that it was unconstitutional as applied to the Larsens in two steps.  
First, the court ruled the Larsens’ wedding videos were pure speech170 
covered by the First Amendment.171  To support that ruling, the court 
reasoned that the wedding videos would be sufficiently expressive to bring 
the First Amendment into play because the Larsens wished to shape public 
discourse about marriage through the videos.172  The fact that the Larsens’ 
videos were not “feature films”173 was inconsequential.174  The court rejected 
the government’s argument that the videos would be commercial conduct 
 
 162. MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.11(1)(a)(1), 363A.17 (2020). 
 163. Id. Section 363A.11 of the MHRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation in places open to the public:  “It is an unfair discriminatory practice:  (1) to deny 
any person the full and equal enjoyment of [goods and services] . . . of a place of public 
accommodation because of . . . sexual orientation.” Id. § 363A.11.  Section 363A.17 of the 
MHRA equally prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in business settings:  “It is an unfair 
discriminatory practice for a person engaged in a trade or business . . . to intentionally refuse 
to do business with . . . [a person because of their] sexual orientation.” Id. § 363A.17. 
 164. Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 750. 
 165. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 8, Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d 740 (No. 17-3352). 
 166. Id. at 9. 
 167. See id. at 8 (“The Larsens witnessed the cultural redefinition of marriage with concern.  
They have seen the debate and want to take part in that public dialogue.  The Larsens want to 
tell stories through their films of marriages between one man and one woman that magnify 
God’s design and purpose for marriage.”). 
 168. Id. at 24. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Pure speech is distinct from expressive conduct or symbolic speech. See supra notes 
122–24 and accompanying text (noting that the First Amendment protects literal speech more 
vigorously than expressive conduct or speech). 
 171. Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 750 (“[E]xpression by means of motion pictures is 
included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First [Amendment].” (quoting 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952))). 
 172. Id. at 751. 
 173. Id. 
 174. In contrast, the dissenting opinion took issue with the majority’s treatment of the 
wedding videos as First Amendment protected films, rather than services offered to the public. 
Id. at 776 (Kelly, J., dissenting).  In support, the dissent distinguished the Larsens’ services 
from those of filmmakers whose films are conventionally thought of as First Amendment 
protected speech. Id. at 775 (“[The Larsens’] counsel compared them to ‘Steven 
Spielberg’ . . . .  But Steven Spielberg is not a public accommodation . . . .”). 
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falling outside the First Amendment’s coverage.175  Accordingly, in rejecting 
the government’s argument and ruling for the Larsens, the court reasoned 
that if the Minnesota government applied the MHRA to Telescope to require 
the company to provide film services equally to same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples, then it would be compelling the Larsens’ speech.176 
Next, the court reviewed the MHRA under strict scrutiny, creating an 
exception for the Larsens’ business activity.177  The court reasoned that 
“[l]aws that compel speech” warrant strict scrutiny, meaning the MHRA 
would have to serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to 
that interest.178  The court relied heavily on Hurley to apply strict scrutiny,179 
instead of another level of review, as suggested in FAIR.180  The court noted, 
“the [Supreme] Court drew the line exactly where the Larsens ask us to here:  
to prevent the government from requiring their speech to serve as a public 
accommodation for others.”181  In appealing to Hurley, the court found the 
MHRA “regulate[d] speech itself,” going “too far.”182  Therefore, it 
concluded that the MHRA did not pass constitutional muster because “as 
compelling as the interest in preventing discriminatory conduct may be, 
speech is treated differently,”183 and so the MHRA must yield to the First 
 
 175. Id. at 752 (majority opinion) (“To be sure, producing a video requires several actions 
that, individually, might be mere conduct:  positioning a camera, setting up microphones, and 
clicking and dragging files on a computer screen.  But what matters most . . . is that these 
activities come together to produce . . . ‘medi[a] for the communication of ideas.’” (quoting 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952))).  Compare id., with Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 66 (N.M 2013) (ruling that wedding photographs 
were products effectuated by an “ordinary public accommodation” and constituted business 
conduct falling outside the First Amendment’s coverage). 
 176. Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 752 (noting that the MHRA “compels the Larsens 
to speak favorably about same-sex marriage if they choose to speak favorably about opposite- 
sex marriage”). 
 177. Id. at 759–60. 
 178. Id. at 754 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)).  Though 
the court principally relied on Hurley for that position, the court also cited to the line of cases 
in which the courts applied strict scrutiny to challenged laws that facially compelled or 
regulated speech. See id. at 753 (discussing content-based speech regulations).  Note, however, 
the Supreme Court draws lines between the facial and incidental compulsion of speech, the 
former triggering strict scrutiny and the latter not necessarily so. See supra note 72 and 
accompanying text. 
 179. Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754.  In contrast, the dissenting opinion argued 
that intermediate scrutiny should apply to the case for two reasons. Id. at 776 (Kelly, J., 
dissenting).  First, the MHRA does not facially regulate speech. Id.  Second, the MHRA, as 
applied, interferes with expressive conduct, which is subject to intermediate scrutiny under 
O’Brien:  “[A] regulation of conduct does not become a regulation of content . . . .  Laws with 
merely incidental effects on expression are subject to intermediate scrutiny.” Id. (citing United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968)). 
 180. Id. at 758 (majority opinion) (“The facts of the case, as pleaded by the Larsens, are 
much closer to Hurley than to . . . F.A.I.R.”). 
 181. Id. at 755. 
 182. Id. at 758.  The court seems to suggest that, under Hurley, when a facially neutral law, 
as applied, compels speech ex post, it is on par with a law that regulates speech ex ante. See 
supra note 178 and accompanying text.  This Note addresses the blending of compelled speech 
and regulation of speech in the section below. 
 183. Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 755. 
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Amendment.  The Eighth Circuit thus held the MHRA was unconstitutional 
as applied to the Larsens because it could not survive strict scrutiny.184 
2.  Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix 
In Brush & Nib, LC v. City of Phoenix,185 the Arizona Supreme Court, 
relying in part on the analytical framework set forth in Telescope Media 
Group, held that wedding invitation designers have a right to provide their 
customized services to opposite-sex couples only.186  Here, plaintiffs 
Breanna Koski and Joanna Duka, who own Brush & Nib Studio, LC (“Brush 
& Nib”), sought to enjoin the Phoenix government from enforcing provisions 
of the Phoenix City Code (PCC),187 which would prevent Brush & Nib from 
establishing a same-sex couple “refusal policy.”188  Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski 
challenged the PCC provisions that prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation in public accommodations.189  They argued that, as 
Christian artists, they “must honor God”190 using their talents.  Accordingly, 
Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski would only accept requests that they believed 
conveyed messages in line with their religious convictions.191  Ms. Duka and 
Ms. Koski also argued that the customized invitations expressed their views; 
while they initially collaborate with a client to form the basis of the invitation, 
the final product relays their own vision.192  Accordingly, Ms. Duka and Ms. 
Koski claimed that applying the PCC to their business would compel their 
speech by requiring them to alter their message that marriage is between a 
man and a woman.193 
The court held that the relevant portions of the PCC unconstitutionally 
compelled Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s speech in two steps.194  First, the court 
found the Free Speech Clause sufficiently covered Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s 
customized invitations as “pure speech.”195  The court reasoned that state and 
federal precedent have treated “written and spoken words” and “original 
artwork” as speech.196  Because the custom wedding invitations “contain[ed] 
 
 184. Id. at 758. 
 185. 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019). 
 186. Id. at 909–10. 
 187. PHX., ARIZ., CITY CODE § 18-4(B)(2)–(3) (2019). 
 188. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 899.  Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski sought to (1) refuse 
requests for same-sex weddings and (2) publish a statement of their policy to that effect. Id.  
However, only the first request is pertinent to this Note because it involves an analysis of 
whether Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s goods are protected speech.  Published statements online 
presumably are speech. 
 189. PHX., ARIZ., CITY CODE § 18-4(B)(2)–(3) (“No person shall, directly or indirectly, 
refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person . . . accommodations . . . because of . . . sexual 
orientation . . . .”). 
 190. Appellants Opening Brief at 1, Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d 890 (No. 1 CA-CV 16-
0602), 2017 WL 1113222, at *1. 
 191. Id. at *6. 
 192. Id. at *7–8. 
 193. Id. at *9. 
 194. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 916. 
 195. Id. at 908. 
 196. Id. at 905–07 (collecting cases). 
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[Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s] hand-drawn words, images, and calligraphy, as 
well as their hand-painted images and original artwork,” the invitations 
themselves were “pure speech.”197  Further, the court rejected the 
government’s argument that the invitations were analogous to the 
unexpressive conduct in FAIR198 because of Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s 
intimate connection with and artistic control over the invitations.199  The 
court concluded the first part of its analysis by stating that the invitations 
were neither flat logistical blocks of text nor fungible goods but, rather, were 
“designed to express a celebratory message about each wedding.”200  
Accordingly, the court ruled the invitations functioned as Ms. Duka and Ms. 
Koski’s speech201 and that to apply the PCC to their business would 
effectively compel their speech. 
In the next portion of the opinion, the court invoked Telescope Media 
Group to apply strict scrutiny to the PCC.202  The court relied on Telescope 
Media Group’s application of Hurley,203 ruling the PCC “must”204 satisfy 
strict scrutiny because the city’s application of the law “declare[d] Plaintiffs’ 
 
 197. Id. at 908. 
 198. In rejecting the analogy to FAIR, the court stated: 
This case bears no resemblance to FAIR.  Here, Plaintiffs’ custom wedding 
invitations, and the creation of those invitations, constitute pure speech . . . .  In 
contrast, FAIR was not “intimately connected” with the empty interview rooms on 
their campuses, nor was it compelled to create emails containing words, phrases, 
and artwork celebrating the military’s presence on campus. 
Id. at 909.  However, the dissent aligned with the government’s argument and, notably, the 
line of reasoning adopted in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 65 (N.M. 2013). 
See Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 932 (Bales, J., dissenting) (“[W]edding invitations may 
be expressive, [but] the operation of a business catering to the public is not.”). 
 199. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 908. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.  In contrast, the dissenting opinion seems to suggest that the invitations could not 
be Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s “pure speech” because any celebratory message is effectively 
intercepted and conveyed by the engaged couple when they send the invitations:  “[T]he 
expression of a wedding invitation, as ‘perceived by spectators as part of the whole’ is that of 
the marrying couple.” Id. at 933 (Bales, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 577 (1995)). 
 202. However, the opinion takes Telescope Media Group’s scrutiny analysis one step 
further.  The court conflates the compelled speech doctrine with speech regulation case law: 
[W]e must first decide what level of scrutiny applies to the [PCC].  This requires us 
to examine whether the [PCC] is a content-neutral or content-based regulation of 
speech . . . .  When a facially content-neutral law is applied by the government to 
compel speech, it operates as a content-based law. 
Id. at 912–13 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  Instead of appealing to Hurley’s 
suggestion that a facially neutral law should be subject to strict scrutiny and moving on, the 
court leveled the compelled speech doctrine by treating laws that facially compel speech and 
incidentally burden speech as one in the same.  However, the Supreme Court has instructed 
otherwise. See supra Part II.B.  The dissenting opinion highlighted this flaw, taking issue with 
the majority’s treatment of the PCC as a measure that functions to regulate speech.  The 
opinion notes that the PCC facially regulates discrimination, not speech, an important 
distinction to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 934 
(Bales, J., dissenting). 
 203. See Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 913–14 (discussing Hurley as “instructive” and 
the scrutiny analysis in Telescope Media Group as within the same line of reasoning). 
 204. Id. at 914. 
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‘speech itself to be the public accommodation.’”205  The court concluded that 
the measure failed under strict scrutiny because it neither served a compelling 
interest nor was it narrowly tailored.206  Accordingly, the court held for Ms. 
Duka and Ms. Koski, excepting their business activity from the PCC. 
Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studio stand for two main 
propositions.  First, the cases set the precedent that wedding vendors’ goods 
and services are speech, though the opinions execute their speech analyses 
differently.  Second, the cases rule that strict scrutiny is the appropriate 
standard of review for determining whether antidiscrimination laws, though 
facially neutral towards speech, violate the First Amendment.  Together, the 
cases represent one side of the division in the wedding vendor line of cases. 
B.  Neither Speech nor Conduct as Speech:  State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. 
Standing on the other side of the wedding vendor dividing line is State v. 
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.207  In contrast with Telescope Media Group and Brush 
& Nib Studio, in Arlene’s Flowers, the Washington State Supreme Court 
decided Ms. Stutzman’s compelled speech claim at the threshold.  The court 
held the sale of floral wedding arrangements was not speech.208  Ms. 
Stutzman owns Arlene’s Flowers, a small flower shop in Washington, where 
she designs floral arrangements for customers with three other floral 
designers.209  She is an active member of her church and sincerely believes 
“marriage can exist only between one man and one woman.”210  When 
Robert Ingersoll, a Washington resident and repeat customer of Arlene’s 
Flowers, spoke with Ms. Stutzman at her store to request floral arrangements 
for his wedding to Curt Freed, Ms. Stutzman denied Mr. Ingersoll’s request 
on religious grounds.211  Mr. Ingersoll left the interaction feeling dejected.212  
Ms. Stutzman then implemented an unofficial policy of rejecting requests for 
same-sex weddings.213  After the Washington State attorney general learned 
about that interaction, the state government commenced suit against Ms. 
 
 205. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 572–73 (1995)). 
 206. Regarding a compelling interest, the court cites to Telescope Media Group v. Lucero, 
936 F.3d 740, 755 (8th Cir. 2019), stating that even if the government argues that the PCC 
serves the compelling interest of eradicating discrimination, it is not sufficiently compelling 
when it captures speech. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 915.  Regarding the law being 
narrowly tailored, the court reasoned that “because the purpose of the [PCC] is to regulate 
conduct, not speech, regulating Plaintiffs’ speech is not narrowly tailored to accomplish this 
goal.” Id. 
 207. 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (No. 19-
333). 
 208. Id. at 1225. 
 209. Id. at 1211. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id.  Notably, Mr. Ingersoll and Ms. Stutzman did not discuss logistics of the wedding, 
such as the type of flowers or floral arrangements he sought or whether the store would deliver 
the arrangements to the wedding location.  Accordingly, Ms. Stutzman’s blanket rejection 
occurred before she knew how personally involved she would be in the event. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1212. 
2608 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
Stutzman pursuant to the Washington Law Against Discrimination214 
(WLAD), a public accommodations law.  Ms. Stutzman asserted that 
applying the antidiscrimination statute to her would “impermissibly”215 
compel her to speak in favor of same-sex marriage, in violation of her First 
Amendment right to free speech.216  She contended her floral arrangements 
are speech under the First Amendment because the arrangements express her 
unique artistic ability.217 
However, Ms. Stutzman did not convince the court of her argument for 
two reasons.  First, the court ruled that neither the creation of floral 
arrangements nor the floral arrangements themselves are literal speech 
covered by the First Amendment.218  Then, the court invited the possibility 
that the floral arrangements could be expressive “conduct as speech”219 
covered by the First Amendment.  However, the court ruled that Ms. 
Stutzman’s conduct did not satisfy the requisite conduct-as-speech 
standard.220 
To determine whether Ms. Stutzman’s conduct was speech (i.e., expressive 
conduct), the court applied the “inherently expressive test,” invoked in 
FAIR.221  The court stated two conditions must be satisfied for conduct to be 
sufficiently expressive to implicate the First Amendment:  “[(1)] [a]n intent 
to convey a particularized message was present, and [(2)] in the surrounding 
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood 
by those who viewed it.”222  The court explained that to pass the second 
prong,223 strong intention and personal involvement are not enough; rather, 
the conduct must be “clearly expressive, in and of itself, without further 
explanation.”224 
In determining whether Ms. Stutzman satisfied the second prong, the court 
appealed to FAIR and distinguished the presented facts from those in 
Hurley.225  As in FAIR,226 the court reasoned one of several messages could 
 
 214. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215 (2020) (“It shall be an unfair practice for any 
person . . . to commit an act which directly or indirectly results in any distinction, restriction, 
or discrimination . . . or the refusing or withholding from any person the . . . patronage . . . in 
any place of public [accommodation] . . . [on the basis of] sexual orientation . . . .”). 
 215. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d at 1224. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 1224–25. 
 218. Id. at 1225 (“We agree [with the State] that the regulated activity at issue in this 
caseStutzman’s sale of wedding floral arrangementsis not ‘speech’ in a literal sense and 
is thus properly characterized as conduct.”). 
 219. Id. (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam)). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id.; see supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text (discussing the inherently 
expressive test). 
 222. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d at 1225 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam)). 
 223. Although the opinion does not explicitly say so, Ms. Stutzman arguably satisfied the 
first prong of the test. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1227 (collecting cases). 
 225. Id. at 1226. 
 226. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006). 
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be implicated by Ms. Stutzman’s refusal policy.227  Thus, a reasonable 
observer could not conclude that Ms. Stutzman rejected Mr. Ingersoll’s 
business because it implicated her views against same-sex marriage.  The 
court then addressed Hurley’s implications for expressive conduct:  “Hurley 
is therefore unavailing to Stutzman:  her store is the kind of public 
accommodation that has traditionally been subject to antidiscrimination 
laws.”228  It did not find Ms. Stutzman’s business conduct on par with the 
inherent expressiveness of a parade.229  The court concluded that Ms. 
Stutzman’s conduct was not inherently expressive and failed to implicate the 
Free Speech Clause.230  Therefore, Ms. Stutzman was ultimately held liable 
under the WLAD.231 
In response, Ms. Stutzman has filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court.232  Ms. Stutzman urges the Court to rule that her floral arrangements 
are covered under the First Amendment.233  In support, she continues to argue 
that her floral arrangements constitute “artistic expression,” invoking Hurley 
to support the proposition that the First Amendment grants protections 
beyond the written or spoken word.234  In the alternative, Ms. Stutzman 
contends that the Washington Supreme Court erred in its application of the 
“inherently expressive” test because the floral arrangements are expressive 
in and of themselves; the court should not have focused on whether her 
refusal sent a particular message.235 
Ms. Stutzman concludes that the WLAD unconstitutionally compels her 
speech because the law fails under strict scrutiny.  Directly citing to 
Telescope Media Group, she argues strict scrutiny applies to the WLAD 
because it functions to regulate her speech content.236  Also relying on 
Telescope Media Group, she insists the WLAD fails under strict scrutiny 
 
 227. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d at 1226. (“[A]n outside observer may be left to wonder 
whether a wedding was declined for one of at least three reasons:  a religious objection, 
insufficient staff, or insufficient stock.”). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1226–28. 
 230. Id. at 1228.  Because the Free Speech Clause was not implicated, the court did not 
need to engage in a scrutiny analysis. 
 231. Id. at 1237.  Ms. Stutzman also asserted state and federal constitutional violations of 
her free exercise and associational rights.  However, the Washington Supreme Court also 
dismissed those claims: 
[T]he WLAD may be enforced against Stutzman because it does not infringe any 
constitutional protection.  As applied in this case, the WLAD does not compel 
speech or association.  And assuming that it substantially burdens Stutzman’s 
religious free exercise, the WLAD does not violate her right to religious free 
exercise under either the [Washington or U.S. Constitutions] because it is a neutral, 
generally applicable law that serves our state government’s compelling interest in 
eradicating discrimination in public accommodations. 
Id. 
 232. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9. 
 233. Id. at 7. 
 234. Id. at 27–30. 
 235. Id. at 29 (“[Stutzman’s] claim is that her custom wedding art is itself expressive, not 
simply that the act of declining to create it is expressive.”). 
 236. Id. at 32–33. 
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because the law neither serves a compelling interest nor is narrowly 
tailored.237 
The arguments Ms. Stutzman briefed in her petition for certiorari track the 
analysis set forth in Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studio.  The 
Washington government continues to argue her business conduct should not 
be protected by the First Amendment.238  Thus, the First Amendment issues 
of (1) whether wedding goods and services are “speech” and (2) if so, which 
level of scrutiny should apply to a neutral law incidentally burdening that 
speech are once again posed at the Supreme Court level. 
III.  ADJUDICATORY AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE WEDDING 
VENDOR CASES 
As the speech and scrutiny questions implicated by the wedding vendor 
cases remain ripe for review, this Part suggests that a presiding court should 
resolve the disparities in wedding vendor case precedent as follows.  Part 
III.A.1 suggests that a presiding court should apply the “inherently 
expressive test”239 employed in Arlene’s Flowers to resolve the threshold 
issue of whether a given vendor’s service is covered by the First Amendment.  
Part III.A.2 suggests that if a wedding vendor’s business activity passes the 
inherently expressive test, the court should apply intermediate scrutiny to the 
challenged law. 
However, because Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2 pose two hurdles to a party 
aggrieved on religious grounds, Part III.B suggests a legislative alternative 
for those who feel religiously burdened when providing services for same-
sex weddings.  It first suggests that the wedding vendors’ religious interests 
are best vindicated through free exercise claims.  However, with Smith still 
applicable at the state level,240 aggrieved parties could turn to their state 
legislators to propose a religious freedom act241 or small business exception 
to public accommodations laws. 
 
 237. Id. at 33–34 (“Relying on this Court’s free-speech cases like Hurley, the Eighth Circuit 
held that ‘regulating speech because it is [allegedly] discriminatory or offensive is not a 
compelling state interest, however hurtful the speech may be.’ . . .  Besides the absence of a 
compelling interest, the State also fails strict scrutiny because it can pursue its goals by 
narrower means without infringing Barronelle’s First Amendment rights.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 755 (8th Cir. 2019))). 
 238. Without explicitly conceding that the floral arrangements are covered under the First 
Amendment, the government has replied that Ms. Stutzman’s flowers might be expressive but 
the WLAD does not regulate that expression. State’s Brief in Opposition at 20, Arlene’s 
Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 19-333 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2019).  Rather, the government 
argues, the WLAD regulates Ms. Stutzman’s act of refusing service for a same-sex wedding, 
which seems to suggest the government is dodging the speech question to focus the Supreme 
Court on what the WLAD regulates in practice. See id.  The government contends the WLAD 
does not direct Ms. Stutzman as to how she should create her floral arrangements but, rather, 
regulates her discriminatory business decisions. Id. 
 239. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1225 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. 
filed (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (No. 19-333). 
 240. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining that Smith renders a federal First Amendment free 
exercise claim a dead end). 
 241. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing federal and state RFRAs). 
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A.  A Two-Part Conciliatory Adjudicative Framework:  The Inherently 
Expressive Test and Intermediate Scrutiny 
This section proposes that courts should adopt the inherently expressive 
test promulgated under Arlene’s Flowers242 to resolve the threshold speech 
inquiry in the wedding vendor cases.  If the test is satisfied, this section then 
proposes courts should apply intermediate scrutiny to the challenged 
antidiscrimination law. 
1.  The Inherently Expressive Test Is the Appropriate Standard to 
Determine Whether Wedding Goods and Services Are Speech 
The inherently expressive test aims to sort out whether a vendor’s business 
activity is sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection.243  
Expressive conduct will warrant constitutional protection if two requirements 
are met:  (1) there was intent to convey a particularized message and (2) in 
the surrounding circumstances, the likelihood was great that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.244 
In analyzing the second prong of the inherently expressive test, a 
reviewing court should consider two primary factors.  The first factor, as 
elaborated Arlene’s Flowers,245 is whether a reasonable person would 
perceive a particular message when a vendor provides or refuses service or, 
rather, one of many.  That factor has direct support under Supreme Court 
precedent.246  A second factor is whether a reasonable person receiving or 
viewing the vendor’s good or service would understand the message to be 
that of the vendor or, rather, the married couple.247  This factor is arguably 
more dispositive than the first.  The compelled speech cases prevent, in part, 
the harms of unwanted association, attribution, and endorsement,248 so 
linking the message back to the vendor is crucial if it is to be treated as his or 
her speech.  Thus, if a reasonable person perceives a particular message as 
flowing from the vendor, then the vendor’s good or service is arguably 
expressive conduct under the Free Speech Clause. 
In practice, the inherently expressive test will serve as a tool to separate 
meritorious speech claims from those that would dilute the meaning of 
 
 242. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d at 1225–28. 
 243. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 244. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d at 1225 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 
410–11 (1974) (per curiam)).  It is likely that the wedding vendors would satisfy the first 
requirement because they tend to plead their cases with conviction and particularity.  However, 
satisfaction of the second prong would hinge on whether the final product is susceptible to 
varied interpretations (with FAIR’s line of reasoning as a guidepost) or is so expressive that 
the end user needs no additional explanation (with Hurley’s line of reasoning as a guidepost). 
 245. Id. at 1226. 
 246. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) 
(quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)). 
 247. For support of this proposition, see supra note 201 (discussing attribution in the 
wedding vendor cases). See also CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 89. 
 248. See Greene, supra note 60, at 1494. 
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speech.249  The test is appropriate to determine the threshold “speech” issue 
in the wedding vendor cases from both fairness and precedential 
perspectives.  This section will detail three specific reasons to that effect. 
First, the test acknowledges the goods and services for what they 
areproducts of the wedding vendors’ commercial conduct that also have 
expressive elements.250  Treating the goods and services as “pure speech,” as 
in Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studio, or as completely 
unexpressive business conduct251 is too far afield from that reality.  These 
cases are perplexing because the vendors are in creative lines of business.252  
From a fairness perspective, the test balances two competing intereststhe 
wedding vendors’ potential speech liberties and the government’s interest in 
regulating commercial conduct.  The test is reasonable because it reflects 
both the interests at stake and the reality that the vendors’ activities are not 
clear-cut. 
Second, the inherently expressive test is a pragmatic standard that courts 
can apply.  While the courts will decide on a case-by-case basis which 
activities rise to the level of expressive conduct as speech, a clear standard 
will create more consistency among similarly situated vendors.  The test 
provides a clear guidepost, which removes the temptation to outright rule,253 
or to weave together various speech cases254 to conclude that products are 
“pure speech.”  If courts were to uniformly apply the inherently expressive 
test, parties could better regulate their conduct ex ante instead of speculating 
how a given court might rule after the fact. 
Third, the test provides an analytical check to determine which speech 
claims should properly pass through the courts.  O’Brien instructs that not all 
conduct is sufficiently expressive to bring the First Amendment into 
playspeech is not synonymous with “intent” or “creativity” because speech 
must send a message.255  Ultimately, reliance on Arlene’s Flowers is more 
 
 249. See Corbin, supra note 57, at 370 (noting that to treat anything colloquially understood 
as speech or expression would dilute the right to freedom of speech). 
 250. See supra notes 218–19; see also Greene, supra note 16, at 678 (“The arguments 
against custom wedding cake baking as expressive are first-order and second-order.  The first-
order argument is that such a baker is just running a business, fulfilling customer demand, 
producing cakes as if he were producing any other good.  But the argument cannot be that he 
is producing cakes as if he were producing widgets, because the whole point of a made-to-
order business (or part of a business) is that the goods aren’t fungible.”). 
 251. See, e.g., supra notes 198, 218, 238 and accompanying text (discussing that the 
Phoenix, New Mexico, and Washington State governments have frequently argued the 
wedding vendors’ activities are nonexpressive business conduct). 
 252. See Greene, supra note at 16, at 678. 
 253. See supra note 171. 
 254. See supra note 196. 
 255. See supra note 122. 
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faithful to free speech case law256 and the right itself257 than reliance on 
Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studio.  The former scrutinizes the 
message received, whereas the latter two draw artificial speech lines.258  The 
test centers on an inquiry into whether the withheld service evokes a 
particular message flowing from the proprietor, not whether the service has 
blanket expressiveness or creativity.  The Supreme Court has drawn “speech” 
lines in the past, illustrated by O’Brien, ultimately, to preserve the right 
altogether.259 
2.  If Wedding Goods or Services Pass the Inherently Expressive Test, the 
Courts Should Apply Intermediate Scrutiny 
If a good or service were to pass the inherently expressive test, 
intermediate scrutiny should apply260 for three reasons.  First, the test aims 
to sort out which conduct is sufficiently imbued with speech elements to be 
covered by the First Amendment.  When speech and nonspeech elements fuse 
into the same course of conduct, O’Brien and its progeny are guiding 
precedent.261 
Second, an alternative to intermediate scrutiny could be strict scrutiny, as 
suggested by Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studio, which 
primarily invoked Hurley.262  However, appealing to O’Brien and its progeny 
better aligns with the structure of the wedding vendor cases given their 
blending of speech and nonspeech elements.263  Further, the analogy to 
Hurley does not wash.  Hurley involved a “peculiar” application of an 
antidiscrimination law.264  In the wedding vendor cases, public 
 
 256. As discussed in FAIR, the inherently expressive test concerns whether a reasonable 
person observing the activity would think the activity is expressing a particular message when 
taken in context, not whether the activity has expressive elements.  Freedom of speech and 
expression protects a message actually conveyed, not an intention to convey a message. 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66–67 (2006); see 
supra note 122. 
 257. See supra Part I.B (discussing the right to free speech). 
 258. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text. 
 259. See Corbin, supra note 57, at 270. 
 260. For expert support on this suggestion, see id. at 281 (observing that in the line of 
wedding vendor cases, the antidiscrimination laws compel “expressive conduct, and therefore 
would be subject to the intermediate scrutiny of O’Brien rather than the strict scrutiny of 
Barnette and Wooley”). See also Greene, supra note 16, at 676 (“If an iteration of Cakeshop 
returns to the Court, the Court similarly should apply O’Brien as true intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 261. See supra note 124. 
 262. See supra note 85. 
 263. See supra note 123; see also Corbin, supra note 57, at 281.  Additionally, the Eighth 
Circuit’s and the Arizona Supreme Court’s treatments of the antidiscrimination laws as 
content-based regulations to later invoke cases applying strict scrutiny is arguably askew. See 
supra notes 178, 202, 203.  Within the compelled speech cases, the Supreme Court 
distinguishes between facial and incidental speech burdens whereas those courts have blurred 
that distinction to apply a demanding standard of review. See supra note 72.  Thus, their strict 
scrutiny discussions are less persuasive from a precedential perspective. 
 264. See supra note 88. 
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accommodations laws are conventionaltheir activities are unlike parades 
because they are registered businesses open to the public.265 
Third, given the liberties at stake, intermediate scrutiny more adequately 
weighs the interests on both sides instead of closing the case from the 
outset.266  An antidiscrimination law will pass intermediate scrutiny if (1) it 
furthers “an important or substantial governmental interest,” (2) is enacted 
“unrelated to the suppression of free expression,” and (3) the “incidental 
restriction [it poses] on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than 
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”267  The three-pronged 
intermediate scrutiny test is designed to leave room for a duly enacted law 
that advances a clear social purpose.  The very language of the test accounts 
for important governmental purposes, recognizes that the purpose may come 
into conflict with another important right, and allows a judge to resolve the 
competing interests on a case-by-case basis.  Strict scrutiny, on the other 
hand, is often fatal in practice to a challenged law.268  Intermediate scrutiny 
aligns with the idea that when a complex social issue is implicated, though 
the Court has the power to analyze a constitutional question, it should 
consider the legislator’s choice to advance a particular policy.269  In the 
wedding vendor cases, that means a policy choice favoring marriage equality 
over the ability to speak freely in opposition.  Thus, applying intermediate 
scrutiny would strike a balance between rational basis and strict scrutiny in 
weighing the merits on either side of the wedding vendor dispute. 
B.  A Legislative Alternative:  State RFRAs and Small Business Carve-Outs 
With the approach laid out above, pleading a free speech claim may seem 
like a high bar to clear for the paradigmatic religious vendor because the 
vendor must first satisfy the inherently expressive test and then defeat the 
government against the backdrop of intermediate scrutiny.  This section 
offers an alternative legislative solution, which could bear fruit more readily 
than bringing a free speech claim to court, especially given that the line of 
wedding vendor cases might not be an exact fit for vindication of free speech 
to begin with.270 
 
 265. Even if proprietors enter the wedding business as a mode of expressing their beliefs, 
as discussed above, an intention to express a message or to engage in creative activities is not 
enough to bring activity into the free speech ambit. 
 266. Strict scrutiny is conventionally rights-favoring and, as indicated in Hurley, is a 
frequent dead end for the government.  Rational basis is conventionally government-leaning 
and, as indicated in Smith, is a frequent dead end for the individual. 
 267. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).  Arguably, an antidiscrimination 
law will satisfy the first prong because eradicating discrimination is a compelling interest and 
unrelated to regulating speech.  Conceivably, an antidiscrimination law could fail under the 
third prong. 
 268. See supra note 48. 
 269. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Greene, supra note 44, at 121 (“Phillips refused to bake the cake for Craig and 
Mullins not because he was an artist but because he was a Christian.  A freedom of religion 
frame would have set the issues in the terms in which the litigants actually experienced 
them . . . .”). 
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Affected individuals could rally their municipal or state legislators to 
propose a religious freedom act or an exemption to a public accommodations 
law.  This alternative is a modest271 and democratic one.  The public votes 
for legislators, whereas judges are frequently appointed by executive 
officials.272  Yet, judges effectively make policy decisions about religious 
liberty and antidiscrimination with the stroke of a pen when deciding whether 
to hold for a wedding vendor.273  If a community is unsatisfied with their 
elected officials’ policy choices, it can vote them out of office.  Judges, on 
the other hand, are often tenured.274  When inhabitants of a judicial district 
are dissatisfied with the outcome of a highly contested wedding vendor case, 
they do not have the same recourse as they would if the decision were made 
through legislative channels. 
State and local legislators are best suited to make policy decisions about 
difficult social issues as a function of their law-making role.275  When a 
complex social issue implicates constitutional rights on one side and the 
advancement of antidiscrimination measures on the other, legislators’ 
institutional competence positions them to discern the appropriate balance.276  
A legislator has an eye to resolve such complex issues holistically, whereas 
a judge must decide ad hoc.277  Further, constituents generally have more 
faith in local officials than in federal officials to adequately represent 
them.278  Presumably, then, if constituents lobbied local officials to enact a 
form of legislation, subsequent legislative inaction could reflect a policy 
choice to bolster marriage equality in light of contemporary values of 
LGBTQIA+ progress.279  Conversely, if a state or municipality were to enact 
 
 271. The Court could overrule Smith to change the standard of review for a free exercise 
claim.  However, this section assumes the validity of Smith and suggests a local legislative 
solution as a more modest step than overruling Supreme Court precedent. 
 272. Federal judges are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate and hold 
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 277. See supra notes 37–42. 
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specific legislation for religious liberty, an aggrieved party would be 
vindicated through a more intuitive280 and democratically legitimate channel. 
A legislative solution on the state level could take the form of a religious 
freedom act that simply mirrors the RFRA.281  Though they may have fallen 
out of favor due to the political climate in 2015,282 legislators should not treat 
them with hostility.  The RFRA has protected the rights of inmates, 
government employees, and churchgoers.283  When placed in context with its 
purpose, and out of politics, a state RFRA can similarly do much good in 
promoting the free exercise of all religions. 
Within the religious vendor context, a state RFRA would thus require 
vendors to show that a public accommodations law substantially burdens 
their religion.284  If the vendor adequately pleaded that burden, the reviewing 
court would apply strict scrutiny to the challenged law.285  Though strict 
scrutiny might seem draconian for antidiscrimination laws,286 a religious 
freedom act modeled after the RFRA spreads the burden between the 
religious vendor and the government:  the vendor must show that the 
challenged law infringed on a central religious practice or belief.287  
Arguably, that pleading requirement would cut through trivial religious 
exercise claims. 
If a state RFRA is too much of an overhaul, a small business carve-out 
within a public accommodations statute could suffice.  That exemption 
would be narrow, mainly covering proprietors who are personally involved 
in daily business production.288  The “exemption” could be capped for 
businesses of no more than roughly five employees.289  That number aims to 
cover vendors who would have no choice but to engage with the particular 
project to which he or she objects. 
An ex ante legislative solution to the wedding vendor divide provides a 
procedurally legitimate resolution of conflicting values of religious liberty 
and marriage equality.  Instead of an ex post case-by-case judicial solution, 
a legislative one would reflect a democratic policy choice to either give 
religious liberty greater latitude or not, as marriage equality is fully realized. 
 
legislators . . . to reach an agreement or pass a law . . . .”); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra 
note 37, at lxxix (discussing government inaction as a rejection of a particular policy end). 
 280. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text (describing the RFRA). 
 282. See supra note 55. 
 283. See supra note 54. 
 284. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for a successful 
RFRA claim). 
 285. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra note 266. 
 287. See supra note 53. 
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Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 648–655 (2015). 
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CONCLUSION 
The wedding vendor cases reflect broader social values that deeply affect 
Americansreligion and equality.  Given how divisive those values are 
when pitted against one another, clear judicial guidance on how to balance 
the First Amendment issues at stake is necessary.  In the meantime, an 
alternative, up-front legislative resolution might be prudent. 
